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I. Introduction
The important role played by solid waste disposal in to-
day's society cannot be underestimated. The term "solid
waste" means "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treat-
ment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations,
and from community activities.. .. " Although the future may
not be predicted with any accuracy, it is reasonable to surmise
that without provisions for the proper disposal of waste, the
resulting consequences to society's health and well-being, as
well as to the surrounding environment, would be disastrous
at best. Thus, it follows that the laws governing the disposal
of solid wastes and regulating the operation of landfills are
indispensible tools for shaping the future character of the
environment.
Society frequently looks to judicial decisions for the for-
mulation of concepts or principles which may be relied on for
some order in an often chaotic world. Occasionally, these con-
cepts become twisted and distorted with their application, re-
sulting in unanticipated consequences. Such is the case re-
garding the "market participant doctrine '  and the
unexpected results caused by its application in situations in-
volving the disposal of solid wastes.
Although City of Philadelphia v. New Jerseys seemed to
unequivocally decide in the negative the question whether an
1. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1984 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
3. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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individual state could close its borders to other states, specifi-
cally for solid waste disposal purposes, it failed to close a
small loophole through which a concept, previously ex-
pounded in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,4 gained mo-
mentum. This became known as the market participant doc-
trine, exempting states that were actively participating in the
market and allowing them to favor citizens of their own state
over citizens of other states.' This concept was significantly
extended and expanded upon in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.' It is
doubtful that the creation of such a principle, enabling states
to close their borders under the guise of market participation,
was ever anticipated. In fact, it is more likely that the ramifi-
cations caused by its recent application in the area of solid
waste disposal were completely unforeseen.
The market participant concept took on a new dimension
recently in LeFrancois v. Rhode Island.7 Therein, the court
was called upon, once again, to decide whether it was permis-
sible for a state to close its borders, for disposal purposes, to
wastes generated elsewhere.8 Applying the market participant
concept to landfills, the court held that a state's action in lim-
iting access to its landfills was constitutional.' In so doing, the
court reached a conclusion at odds with that reached in City
of Philadelphia." Undoubtedly, this holding will have strong
repercussions and will greatly affect the nature of solid waste
disposal. This note illuminates how a significant judicial prin-
ciple may be both extended and distorted, sometimes creat-
ing, as here, highly unexpected and detrimental results to the
surrounding environment.
4. 426 U.S. at 809.
5. Id.
6. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
7. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987). Note, this case was decided by the district
court on three different constitutional bases: the Commerce Clause, the Contract
Clause and the Privileges & Immunities Clause. For purposes of this note, only the
part of the case dealing with the Commerce Clause will be discussed.
8. Id. at 1212.
9. Id.
10. 437 U.S. at 629.
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II. Facts
The background facts of LeFrancois v. Rhode Island" are
as follows. The plaintiff, Jack LeFrancois, is a resident of
Massachusetts and a commercial hauler of refuse, trash, and
other solid waste. 2 His refuse-hauling business, known as
Blackstone Valley Disposal, operates primarily in the area
around Blackstone, Massachusetts, close to the Rhode Island-
Massachusetts border. 3  Blackstone collects waste from
sources located in both Rhode Island and Massachusetts on a
regular basis, with "approximately 20% to 30% of . . .gross
revenues [being] derive[d] from its waste-collection activities
in Rhode Island."' 4
The defendant is the Rhode Island Solid Waste Manage-
ment Corporation, a legislatively-created agency that is re-
sponsible for "plan[ning], construct[ing], operat[ing] and
maintain[ing] a statewide system of solid waste management
facilities and services. '"15 The Rhode Island Solid Waste Man-
agement Corporation is also the owner of the Central Landfill
in Rhode Island."6 This is "currently the largest sanitary land-
fill in New England and the only sanitary landfill in Rhode
Island that accepts all categories of non-hazardous waste."'' 7
In September of 1986, LeFrancois, doing business as
Blackstone Valley Disposal, entered into a contract with the
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation. 8 The
contract allowed LeFrancois to dispose, at the Central Land-
fill, any waste he collected, regardless of the geographic origin
of the waste, so long as the "amount of Massachusetts waste
deposited at the landfill did not exceed the amount of Rhode
Island waste deposited in Massachusetts."' 9 In accordance
with this agreement, LeFrancois deposited "an average of four
11. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
12. Id. at 1206.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1206.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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hundred tons of solid waste per month at the Central
Landfill."20
In June of 1987, the State of Rhode Island enacted an
amendment to the Rhode Island General Laws which prohib-
ited the disposal, in the Central Landfill, of solid waste gener-
ated outside the territorial limits of Rhode Island."' Any vio-
lation of this law was punishable by up to three years
imprisonment and/or fines of up to five thousand dollars.22
The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation then
notified LeFrancois of the passing of the amendment and in-
formed him of its refusal to accept any further "out-of-state
waste at the Central Landfill, including the [products] that
[were] the subject of the parties' earlier agreement. '23
LeFrancois filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to
prevent the defendant from enforcing the amendment or in-
stituting proceedings against him until the constitutionality of
the amendment to the statute was determined.24
III. Background
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution bestows upon
Congress the power to "regulate commerce ... among the sev-
eral states."25 The Supreme Court has traditionally inter-
preted this grant of power as a limit on the power of the indi-
vidual states to obstruct interstate commerce, regardless of
whether Congress has legislated with respect to a specific ac-
tivity. 26 In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, indi-
20. Id.
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19-13.1 (1987).
The amended statute reads as follows:
(a)No person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of collecting and
disposing of solid waste shall deposit solid waste that is generated or col-
lected outside the territorial limits of that state at the central landfill. Each
deposit in violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by
imprisonment for up to three (3) years and/or a fine not to exceed five thou-
sand dollars ($5000).
22. Id.
23. 669 F. Supp. at 1206.
24. Id. at 1207.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
26. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949).
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vidual states retain some authority to regulate matters that
are of legitimate local concern.27 However, state regulatory ac-
tivity which burdens interstate commerce is normally subject
to a balancing test in which the court weighs the burden
placed upon commerce by the state regulatory activity against
the existence of legitimate purposes necessitating such state
legislation.28
Beginning with Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,29 the
Supreme Court began to grant immunity from the confines of
the Commerce Clause for state activity deemed to be proprie-
tary.30 In Hughes, the State of Maryland enacted a statutory
scheme designed to promote the destruction of abandoned
automobiles. 3 ' To encourage the cleanup of the state's envi-
ronment, Maryland provided for the payment of bounties to
processors of junked cars.32 Prior to receiving the bounty, the
scrap processor had to present documentation which proved
clear title to the vehicle. 33 However, out-of-state processors
were required to provide much more documentation to sup-
port title of the vehicle than those scrap processors located
within the State of Maryland. 34 Because many suppliers of
junk cars were inclined to take these "hulks ' 35 to the proces-
sor demanding the least documentation of title, out-of-state
processors challenged the statute as an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce and, therefore, in violation of the
Commerce Clause.36 However, the Supreme Court held to the
contrary, pronouncing that this type of action was not within
27. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
28. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (The Court's reasoning
was predicated on South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938),
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949), and Raymond Mo-
tor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978)).
29. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
30. Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State Proprietary Activities:
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 365, 367 (1981).
31. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 796.
32. Id. at 797.
33. Id. at 798.
34. Id. at 800-01.
35. Id. at 798.
36. Id. at 802.
1989]
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the realm of the Commerce Clause.37
The Supreme Court found Maryland to be acting as an
actual purchaser within the market, a market participant, and
therefore, immune from the Commerce Clause challenge, 38 "as
the Constitution does not address reactions within the market
place due to market forces, but only taxing and regulatory ac-
tions taken by the state in their sovereign capacity."' 9 Thus,
the Supreme Court carved out of the Commerce Clause a
broad immunity which came to be known as the market par-
ticipant doctrine.40 The doctrine draws a distinction between
a market "regulator""' and a market "participator."42 Thus,
when a state enters the market to bid up the price of an arti-
cle of commerce the state acts as a participant and there is no
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. However, when
the state behaves in a regulatory manner, restricting its trade
to in-state businesses or citizens, there is a significant burden
on interstate commerce. "
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,44 the Supreme
Court struck down a New Jersey statute which banned, on the
basis of health reasons, the importation of refuse into the
state for disposal. The Court declared the statute to be a pro-
tectionist measure which unnecessarily burdened interstate
commerce.45 The Supreme Court held the statute invalid be-
cause it accorded state residents preferential treatment with
respect to landfill access for solid waste disposal within the
state's borders." It was in this vein that the Court sought to
37. Id. at 810.
38. Id. at 809.
39. Note, Concrete Development Chips Away at Commerce Clause Analysis, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 629, 634 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Concrete Development].
40. Observation, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned
Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 87 (1980).
41. Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A Tech-
nique for Excluding Out-of-State Wastes?, 14 ENvTL. L. 177, 186 (1983).
42. Id.
43. Note, Interstate Commerce: Building Cement Walls Against Interstate
Sales, 10 STETSON L. REV. 527, 531 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Building Cement Walls].
44. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
45. Id. at 629.
46. Id. at 628. See Cain, Routes and Roadblocks: State Controls on Hazardous
Waste Imports, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 767, 777 (1983).
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maintain the unburdened, unhampered character of interstate
commerce.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake47 served to significantly extend the
market participant concept from purchasers to sellers, relying
almost exclusively on the precedent set by Hughes."8 In
Reeves, the Supreme Court stated that the Commerce Clause
prohibits states from enacting taxing and regulatory measures
that affect trade, but that nothing exists to prevent or limit
states from operating freely in the marketplace. 9 Reeves in-
volved the State of South Dakota and its operation of a state-
owned cement plant. The state established a policy which pro-
hibited the sale of cement to out-of-state purchasers.50 The
Court held that if a state enters the marketplace as a market
participant, it does not violate the Commerce Clause by refus-
ing to sell a product to out-of-state distributors.5 ' Thus, the
concept of market participant, as extended in Reeves, was
made applicable to states participating in the free market as
purchasers or sellers.2
IV. The District Court's Decision
In LeFrancois v. Rhode Island,5" the court held that a
statute prohibiting the deposit of out-of-state solid wastes in a
state-funded and state-operated landfill did not violate the
Commerce Clause .5 The district court held that a legitimate
local interest was achieved by offering in-state residents a
landfill waste processing service without creating an excessive
burden on interstate commerce by permitting both in-state
and out-of-state parties the opportunity to purchase private
47. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
48. Note, NATURAL RESOURCES - COMMERCE CLAUSE - State Market
Participation Exempt from Commerce Clause Review. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, __ U.S.
-, 100 S. Ct 2271 (1980). 16 LAND & WATER L. REv. 85, 88-89 (1981).
49. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436.
50. Id. at 433.
51. Id. at 436.
52. Note, Building Cement Walls, supra note 38, at 533.
53. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
54. Id. at 1212.
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landfills.55 Thus the Commerce Clause was not offended.5 6
Although a similar ban applied to all public and private
in-state landfills in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the
LeFrancois court distinguished City of Philadelphia. The
LeFrancois court found that the Supreme Court in City of
Philadelphia "express[ed] no opinion about New Jersey's
power, consistent with the Commerce Clause to restrict state
residents' access to state-owned resources, or New Jersey's
power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents
and businesses. ' 57 The LeFrancois court believed that the ac-
tion of the state legislature fell "within the reservation ex-
pressed in footnote six"58 in City of Philadelphia, because the
landfill in question was operated by a public agency and par-
tially funded by the state.59 The court, therefore, framed the
issue as "whether the public character of the ... [1]andfill
exempts the state's action from the restraints of the Com-
merce Clause"6 and answered it in the affirmative.
The LeFrancois court relied on the market participant
doctrine to support its holding.6 1 The court was persuaded by
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in County
Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens.2 In County
Commissioners, the court decided that where a county, state,
or municipal government provides landfill services to waste
haulers and collects a fee for the acceptance and disposal of
the wastes in compliance with all applicable environmental
and health laws, a "market" exists and the market participant
analysis applies. 3
Based on this reasoning, the LeFrancois court concluded
that in operating the landfill, Rhode Island had done nothing
more than purchase a resource (the landfill site) and offered
55. Id. at 1211.
56. Id.
57. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
58. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1208.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1211.
62. 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
63. Id. at 208.
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its customers the waste processing services. 4 The court then
concluded that Rhode Island, by actively taking part in the
competitive business of solid waste disposal, fell within the
market participant concept, and held the state's actions in
limiting access to its landfills to be constitutional.6 5
V. Analysis
The LeFrancois v. Rhode Island 6 decision yields a result
never intended by the Court in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey. 7 The Supreme Court therein closed its opinion with a
warning:
Today cities in Pennsylvania or New York find it expedi-
ent or necessary to send their waste into New Jersey and
New Jersey claims the right to close its borders from such
traffic. Tomorrow cities in New Jersey may find it neces-
sary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York
for disposal, and those states might then claim the right
to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect
New Jersey in the future just as it protects her neighbors
now from efforts by one state to isolate itself in the
stream of commerce from a problem shared by all.68
Rather than heeding this warning, the state of Rhode Island
blatantly defied it, and in so doing opened the flood gates to
innumerable problems in the future of solid waste disposal.
As Justice Powell stated in his dissent in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake,9 this "policy represents the kind of economic protec-
tion the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent . . 70
While the desire to preserve state sovereignty is commenda-
ble, "the Commerce Clause has long been recognized as a limit
on that sovereignty ... designed to maintain a national mar-
64. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1207-08.
65. Id.
66. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
67. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
68. Id. at 629.
69. 447 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 447.
1989]
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ket and defeat economic provincialism.' ' 7I
If courts follow LeFrancois, the effect will be to approve
state protectionist policies, subject only to the condition that
the state directly participate in the free market. This prece-
dent will undoubtedly alter the concept of a free national
economy. If the decision is. applied liberally, unrestricted
trade among the states would dwindle significantly, especially
if undesirable articles of commerce such as toxic pollutants
are involved. Thus, one of the major driving forces behind the
Constitution, the assurance of unrestrained trade between the
states,72 would be considerably contravened. Significant envi-
ronmental concerns would be raised if additional courts per-
mit states to close their borders to certain offensive sub-
stances under the guise of participating in, but not regulating,
the market.
Further important considerations are raised by Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp. . , These possibilities may become the sad reality if ad-
ditional cases rely on LeFrancois. Dissenting in Hughes, Jus-
tice Brennan questioned whether a state may restrict its trade
to its own citizens when it participates in the market as a pur-
chaser.7 This question was one never before considered by
the Court. The Court was, according to Justice Brennan's ar-
gument, not justified in simply making the conclusory asser-
tion that such behavior was permissible.75 Specifically, Justice
Brennan faulted the Court for failing to make known the
source of the "right" which it accorded to the states. 76
Justice Brennan also pointed out that often a much larger
area of commerce is affected by state regulation and that such
effects on commerce are not able to be confined within the
state's boundaries. 77 Further, he encouraged the Court to
sever itself from the state's supposed declaration of purpose
71. Id. at 453.
72. Note, Concrete Development, supra note 39, at 639.
73. 426 U.S. 794, 817 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 821-22.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 822.
77. Id. at 822-23.
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and to closely scrutinize the regulatory measure which may
often reveal that the "purported objective is feigned and not
the real purpose.""8
This is precisely the type of allegation justifiably made
against states, such as Rhode Island herein, enacting statutes
prohibiting certain undesirable substances to be transported
across their borders. The Court rightfully should question
whether the state is acting as a participant in the market-
place, or merely under the mask of a participant as a means to
protect its own environment and citizens.
Justice Brennan further stated that "little imagination is
required to foresee future state actions" which may work to
further burden the free economy envisioned in the formula-
tion of the Commerce Clause. This is especially so "if all state
action is to be immunized from further analysis merely be-
cause the design of the regulatory scheme" is such that a mar-
ket participant label may be applied. 9
VI. Conclusion
Fears expressed by the dissent in Hughes are indeed well-
founded and have become the sad reality in LeFrancois v.
Rhode Island.80 The concept of market participant, when ap-
plied to valid environmental concerns such as the disposal of
toxic pollutants and other solid wastes, yields drastic results
which may prove to be even more disastrous in their conse-
quences over time. Allowing states to close their borders may
ultimately result in the formulation of fifty separate govern-
mental entities making individualized determinations regard-
ing the substances they will permit to be disposed of within
their borders.81
At present, there is no subsequent history to LeFrancois.
The case has not been cited in other opinions, and whether or
78. Id. at 827 (quoting Foster-Fountain Parking Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10
(1928)); see also Buck v. Kuy Kendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925); Toomer v. Witsell
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
79. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 829.
80. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
81. Note, Concrete Development, supra note 39, at 635.
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not it will become a front-runner and develop into a strong
precedent remains to be seen. Should other states develop
similar landfill restrictions and attempt to justify them under
the market participant theory, one can only shudder when
thinking of the potential impact this may have on the
environment.
Attorneys for the plaintiff in LeFrancois indicated that
their decision not to appeal the case was based on the unfa-
vorable trends in case law which seem to make states' protec-
tionist measures legitimate under the market participation
theory."2 The LeFrancois decision is a far cry from the hold-
ings in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 3 and Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp."4 It is doubtful that the Supreme
Court ever anticipated the seemingly legitimate concept of
market participation to expand and gain the potential it now
possesses to wreak havoc on the environment.
Kathleen O'Neill
82. It should be noted that much of the policy considerations discussed in this
paper are also addressed in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Telephone interview with Fontaine and Croll, LTD., Attorneys
for the plaintiff (Oct., 1988).
83. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
84. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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